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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPE

Gottfried Dietze*

I
HE years following the Second World War witnessed a wave
of constitution making in Europe. In East and West alike,
popular government was instituted through new basic laws. But
whereas the constitutions of Eastern Europe established a Rousseauistic form. of democracy through the creation of an omnipotent
legislature,1 those of the West, while reflecting a belief in parliamentary government, to a larger or smaller degree limited the
power of the legislature through the introduction of judicial
review.2 This acceptance of judicial review can be attributed
mainly to two factors. It sprung from a distrust of a parliamentarism under which, during the previous decades, a Mussolini, a
Hitler, and a Petain were able to rise to power, and was a consequence of the revival of natural law against the juridical positivism
of the past generations.3
To Europeans, judicial review has had a great variety of meanings. A distinction was made between the courts' right to test, in
a federal state, acts of the authorities of the component member
states for their compatibility with national law ("federal" judicial
review), and their right to examine national acts for their constitutionality ("national" judicial review). Second, the examination
of administrative decrees passed under the authority of a law was
distinguished from the review of the law itself. Third, a distinction
has been recognized between the formal and material constitutionality of laws, the former being concerned with the question whether the law·has come about in the prescribed procedure ("extrinsic"

T

• Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1948,
Dr. Jur. 1949, Heidelberg University, Ph.D. 1952, Princeton University.-Ed.
1 Constitutions of Albania (1946), art. 37; Yugoslavia (1946), art. 50; Bulgaria (1947),
art. 15; Rumania (1948), art. 37; East Germany (1949), art. 50. In East Germany, legislative supremacy had already been established under the state constitutions of Thuringia
(1946), art. 8; Saxony-Anhalt (1947), art. 24; Brandenburg (1947), art. 9; Saxony (1947),
art. 26; Mecklenburg (1947), art. 22.
2 Constitutions of France (1946), arts. 91-93; Italy (1947), arts. 134-137; Germany
(1949), arts. 93-94. In West Germany, judicial review had also been adopted under the
state constitutions of Wiirttemberg-Baden (1946), art. 92; Bavaria (1946), art. 65; Hesse
(1946), arts. 131-132; Rhineland-Palatinate (1947), arts. 129, 130, 136; Baden (1947), art.
114; Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollern (1947), art. 65.
s See the author's "Natural Law in the Modem European Constitutions," 1 NATURAL
LAW FORUM 73 (1956).
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constitutionality), the latter with the compatibility of the content
of the law with the constitution ("intrinsic" constitutionality). In
all three groups the first alternative has been as generally accepted
as the latter has been rejected.
Dicey's comment that judicial review is a necessary accompaniment of federalism proves, as far as most European federations are
concerned, correct in only a qualified sense.4 The courts do not
play the role of an umpire between national and state interests,
but rather protect national law against infringements by the state
authorities. In Switzerland, the Federal Tribunal can vindicate
the rights of the citizen under the federal constitution against violations by cantonal statutes. Judicial review does not extend to
acts of the Federal Assembly.5 In Imperial Germany a similar
situation existed under the principle "Reichsrecht has preference
before Landesrecht."6 The constitutions of Austria of 1920 and
1929 and the Weimar constitution provided for a broader scope of
"federal" judicial review by giving greater consideration to the
state versus the national interests. As a matter of fact, even "national" judicial review existed under these constitutions,7 but not,.
however, to the degree that it is accepted in the United States.
Many European legislatures enact rather general laws and
authorize administrative officials to issue supplementary provisions and to regulate the details of administration by ordinances.
As a result, most of the rules and provisions affecting the rights of
the individual are made by administrative officials. Over these administrative acts, a vigorous control is exercised either by special
administrative courts, or by the ordinary courts. Whenever an administrative ordinance is considered to be in excess of the authority
granted to the administration, it is annulled. Likewise, administrative acts may be condemned for being unfair or inexpedient.
The review of the legality of administrative rules and ordinances.
has, during past generations, been a standing practice in European
4DICEY, LAW OF nm CONSTITUTION, 8th ed., lxxxviii (1915).
Const., art. 113. See FLEINER-GIACOlllEITI, SCHWEIZERISCHES BUNDESSTAATSRECHT 92ff., 103 ff. (1949).
6 Const., art. 2. See MEYER·ANSCHUETZ, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed.,
715 (1919). Similar art. 13 of the Weimar Const., compare ANSCHUETZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES.
DEUTSCHEN R.EICHS, 14th ed. (1932).
7For Austria, see KELsEN, GRUNDRISS DES OESTERREICHISCHEN STAATSRECHTS 214 (1923);
WrrrMAYER, OESTERREICHISCHES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 22 (1923); EISENMANN, LA JUSTICE CON·
STITUTIONNELLE Er LA HAUTE CoUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE D'AUTRICHE (1928). For Germany, seeANSCHUEIZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN R.EICHS, 14th ed., art. 13, no. 4; art. 70, no. 5.
(1932).
IS
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countries.8 Review of the constitutionality of laws, on the other
hand, was not generally recognized. Consequently, the courts
seldom became involved in a conflict with the legislative department.
European courts have usually tested the formal constitutionality of the laws. This consists of a review of the process of enactment. If it was discovered that the procedural requirements of the
constitution had not been complied with, the law in question was
declared void.9 On the other hand, the testing of the content of a
legislative act for its "intrinsic" constitutionality was the exception
rather than the rule.
In the following pages, the term "judicial review" will not be
used for those variations that have been generally accepted in
Europe. Rather, the review of material national law will be understood by the term. After discussing the advocacy and exceptional existence of this form of judicial review before the Second
World War, we shall deal with the reasons for its general rejection
during that period. This survey of the main theoretical aspects of
judicial review will be followed by a consideration of the practical
organization and scope of that institution in the years after the war.

II
The establishment of judicial review by European constitutions is the consequence of tendencies that had existed since before
World War I. Even France, the classic example of a government
by assembly, had advocates of judicial review. It was considered a
corollary to a written constitution. Writers followed the HamiltonMarshall arguments as interpreted by Cooley and Lord Bryce.10
8 For France, see ALmERT, LE CoNTROLE JURIDICTIONNEL DE L'ADMINISTRATION AU
M:oYEN DU REcoURS POUR EXCES DE Pouvom (1926); DARESTE, LES VOIES DE REcoURS CONTRE
LES ACTES DE LA PUISSANCE PUBLIQUE (1914); LAFERRIERE, TRAITE DE LA JURISDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE ET DES REcoURS CONTENTIEUX (1896). For Germany, see ANSCHUETZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS, 14th ed., art. 70, no. 5; art. 102, no. 5-6 (1932); Jellinek,
"Der Schutz des oeffentlichen Rechts durch ordentliche und durch Verwaltungsgerichte,"
2 VEROEFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 8ff. (1925).
For Italy, see RANELETTI, LEZIONE DI Dmrrro AMMINISTRATIVO (1923-1925); ORLANDO, LA
GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA (1923).
9 For France, see HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 283 (1929); for
Germany, ANSCHUETZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES·DEUTSCHEN REICHs, 14th ed., arL 70; KARL-HEINZ
SEIFERT, DAS RECHT DER GERICHTE, REICHSGESETZE AuF IHRE RECHTSGUELTIGKEIT Zu 'OBERPRUEFEN esp. IOI ff., 139 ff. (Diss. Leipzig, 1933); for Italy, 2 PALMA, Dmrrro CosnroZIONALE, 3d ed., 620-621 (1884); for Switzerland, FLEINER-GIACOMETTI, SCHWEIZERISCHES
BUNDESSTAATSRECHT 931 (1949).
10 l BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 242 ff. (1911); COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 5-6, 332 ff. (1927).
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Constitutional norms, being fundamental laws, are superior to
statutes, or ordinary laws. The judges, when refusing to enforce
a statute because of its incompatibility with the constitution, are
by no means changing the law. They are but the mouthpiece of
the law, following the will of the people-th~ master-rather than
that of its servants-the legislators. Judicial review thus conserves
the popular will as expressed in the constitution. It is the exercise
of a merely judicial function and does not elevate the judges above
the other departments of government or the constitution.11
As to the scope of judicial review, two main tendencies can be
recognized. One group of jurists, believing in higher law as a
limitation on the pouvoir constituant, were in favor of a broad
exercise of judicial review that was oriented toward natural law.
Other ·writers proceeded more cautiously in fear of too abrupt a
break with the tradition of the French Revolution. They rejected
the use of higher law principles and wanted judicial decisions to be
based on the express provisions of the ·written constitution only. •
Outstanding representatives of the first group are Thaller,
Hauriou and Duguit. As early as 1902, Thaller came forward with
the tp.esis ,that there are unwritten principles which form part of
the constitution and are entitled to the same respect as written consitutional norms. Otherwise the citizen would, in the absence of an
express and clearly defined protection of a civil right through the
constitution, be "at the mercy of the la-wmaker who could arbitrarily trample upon that right, reduce and annihilate it." Among
the rights thus protected were even those that "have never been
expressed and which are revealed to us only through our conscience
(sens in time)." Therefore the judges, when refusing to apply a
statute, do so "because their inner conscience tells them that the
law infringes upon the individual's rights to a degree that is beyond
what is reasonable and legitimate."12
Hauriou claimed that the decisions of the Tribunal of Con11 See Jeze, "Notions sur le contr6le des deliberations des assemblees deliberantes,"
54 R.EvuE GENERALE D'ADMINISTRATION 31, 154 (1895); Proa!, "Le r6le du pouvoir judiciaire dans les republiques," 56 R.EvuE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 558 (1908). After the
First World War, the issue of judicial review did not so much turn on the juristic-logical
question of whether judicial review was a consequence of a written and rigid constitution,
but rather on the political question of whether· it was likely to check the dangers of
parliamentarism [See 3 BURDEAU, TRAITE DE SCIENCE PoLITIQUE 346 ff. (1950)]. French
arguments concerning judicial review thus go parallel to those made in Germany at that
time. Cf. pp. 556-558 infra. For a discussion of judicial review and for its logical justifi•
cation in the twenties, see Ho Hlo KY, LE CoNTROLE DE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES LoIS
EN FRANCE (Diss., Paris, 1926).
12 31 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 249 ff. (1902).
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flicts of July 30, 1873, and of the Council of State of August 7, 1909
and March I, 1912, recognized the courts' right to verify the constitutionality of legislative acts.13 Like Thaller an adherent of the
theory of unwritten constitutional principles, Hauriou derived
their existence from the nature of law as an organized system.
Just as the body of private law contains superior principles which
are applied by the judges irrespective of whether they are or are
not put down in the civil codes, he argued, in like manner also
public law contains such principles.14 Therefore, although the
constitutional laws of 1875 do not expressly confirm the rights of
man proclaimed in 1789, those rights are part of the superlegalite
constitutionelle, which is above the written constitution.15 Only
their acknowledgment gives legitimacy to the written constitution.
"It is erroneous," Hauriou maintains, "to believe that the constitutional superlegality comprehends only that which is written
in the Constitution. It comprehends much more, including, for
instance, all the fundamental principles of government, i.e., the
principles of civil rights, which form the basis of the state as much
as the political principles upon which the government is built.
These principles constitute some sort of constitutional legitimacy
(legitimite constitutionelle) which is even above the written constitution."16 A statute that is incompatible with this widened concept of the constitution is not binding upon the judge.17
Duguit's thesis slightly differs from that of his fellow-jurists.
The originator of the concept of the regle de droit, Duguit comes
close to Thaller and Hauriou when he believes in a general rule
of law which is binding upon all positive law. He admired the
American Supreme Court for reading natural law principles into
the Constitution when applying such clauses as "due process of
law," "equal protection of the laws," etc. This constituted in his
eyes a recognition by the Court of his regle de droit and did by
no means amount to a government by the judiciary.18 However,
13 HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 282 ff. (1929). For a different
point of view, see Jcze, "Le controle jurisdictionnel des lois," 41 REvuE DU DRorr Punuc
409 (1924); BARTHELEMY, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL (1926). See also
LEBLANC, DU Pouvom DES TRIBUNAUX D'APPRECIER EN FRANCE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES
LOIS (Diss., Paris, 1924).
14 HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 68 ff. (1929).
15 "To be sure, the principles of our civil liberties [libertes publiques] are not contained in the written constitution, but they are nevertheless present in the constitutional
superlegality, which exists even above the written Constitution." PRECIS DE DRorr CoNSTITUTIONNEL 298 (1923).
16 Id. at 296.
17 HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 268 ff. (1929).
18 3 Ducurr, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 679 (1923).
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Duguit does not deem it necessary, in order to declare a statute
unconstitutional, to have recourse to the concept of an unwritten
constitutionality. In his opinion, the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and Citizen of 1789 "is real law which is superior to ordinary
laws and even ... to constitutional law, from which it is definitely
to be distinguished."19 Just as the Declaration was supposed to be
above the constitution of 1791, in like manner it is above the constitution of the Third Republic and can, therefore, ~erve as a criterion for judicial review. 20
The sweeping concessions which were made to the judiciary
by those who believed in higher law as a guide for the judge were
denied by the more moderate adherents of judicial review. At a
meeting of the Societe de Legislation Comparee in 1902, Saleilles
expressed doubts as to the value of higher law or the vague provisions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789
as a basis for the exercise of the review of legislative acts by the
bench.21 Saleilles declared that he would be all in favor of judicial
review, but only if it were restricted to the testing of legislation
against rights clearly defined as to content and application by the
written constitution. He held that it is inadmissible to base the
unconstitutionality of a law upon its incompatibility with mere
general principles that are considered absolute law, such as individual liberty, cultural liberty, private property, universal suffrage,
because there is no such thing· as an absolute law in society.
"If it is admitted that all statutes which regulate the exercise of an
absolute right that is written in the Constitution can be contested
by the judiciary," Saleilles stated, "then it is no longer possible
to have a legislative or an administrative function. This would
amount to anarchy, provided for by the Constitution itself."22
Saleilles' insistence upon a clearly defined scope of judicial review
was shared by many of his colleagues.23
On the other side of the Rhine, the situation was even more
19 Id. at 564.
20 Id. at 567, 673

ff.

240 ff. (1902).
245-246.
23 For instance, Jeze, "Le contr61e juridictionnel des lois," 41 REvuE DU DRorr Punuc
421 (1924): "The system of control by the judges of the intrinsic constitutionality of a law
would pose grave dangers in France if the theory developed by certain modern authors
of the constitutional character of a great number of general principles, more or less vague,
were adopted. There exists no law of a social, fiscal, educational, or religious character
which might not be set aside by astute judges who feel that it suppresses a fundamental
principle of French law. The aptitude and skill of jurists in justifying every solution is a
well-known and universal historical phenomenon•..•"
21

31

BULI.ErIN DE LA SoCIETE DE LEGISLATION CoMPAREE

22 Id. at
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encouraging for the adherents of judicial review. Germany not
being, like France, a country of government by assembly par excellence, judicial review, scarcely advocated in the days of the Empire,24 had friends not only among the makers and commentators
of the Weimar Constitution, but also among the judges.
Judicial review was favored by some members of the constitutional convention at Weimar. A student of Gneist,25 Hugo Preuss,
often called the father of the Weimar Constitution, was of the
opinion that judicial review would prevail unless it was specifically
excluded. He, a Democrat, was supported by Diiringer of the
German National Party, Cohn and Katzenstein of the Social Democrats. Richterliches Prufungsrecht had thus adherents in all major
parties. However, no provision establishing judicial review was
inserted into the Constitution.26 Nevertheless, instead of continuing the Imperial practice of rejecting the right of the judges to test
laws for their constitutionality, more and more theorists maintained that such a right did exist.27 More important still, judicial
review was actually exercised by the judges.
One of the most vigorous assertions of the principle was a
declaration of the Judges' Association of the National Supreme
Court (Reichsgericht) on January 5, 1924.28 In a decision of November 28, 1923 the Reichsgericht had stated that the revaluation
of mortgages was imperative as a matter of good faith. 29 Here the
court tried to remedy one of the many hardships which had come
about through the inflation and had not yet been mitigated by the
legislature. At once the German government announced its intention to prohibit the revaluation through law. Protesting against
this plan, the Judges' Association declared that the idea of "good
faith (Treu und Glauben) is beyond the particular statute, and
beyond a specific positive norm. No legal order which deserves
that name can exist without recognition of the principle of good
faith. Therefore the lawmaker is not permitted to thwart, through
an arbitrary exercise of power, a decision which is imperatively
required by the principles of good faith." The Judges' Association
24 See MEYER-ANSCHUETZ, LEHrulUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed., 739 ff. (1919);
ANSCHUE'IZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS, 14th ed., art. 70, no. 4 (1932).
25 See GNEIST, DER RECHTSSTAAT UND DIE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND (1872).
26 BERICHTE UND PROTOKOLLE DES ACHTEN AUSSCHUSSES 'OBER DEN ENTWURF EINER
VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS 483 ff. (1920).
27 See Triepel, "Der Weg der Gesetzgebung nach der neuen Reichsverfassung," 39
ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 456 ff., 536 (1920). For other jurists in favor of
judicial review, see notes 40 and 41 infra.
28 See 53 JURISTISCHE WoCHENSCHRilT 90 (1924).
29 Id. at 38 ff.
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then warned the government that such an arbitrary exercise of
legislative power would be considered as "an infringement upon
the principle of good faith, as immoral ( unsittlich) because of its
immoral consequences, as an unconstitutional expropriation"
which was void and would not be applied by the judges.30
This constitutes the assertion of a broad scope of judicial review. Not only do the judges claim a right to test national laws
for their constitutionality, but also for their compatibility with
supra-positive law, like the principle of good faith. This farreaching claim can be attributed to the fact that during the inflation many laws were passed which gave rise to doubts as to
whether Germany was still a Rechtsstaat.31 As one author put it,
the state of emergency laws of the war had developed into a state
of the emergency of the law.32 Small wonder that those who by
their very calling were the guardians of justice should rally forth
to protect the Recht against the Gesetz, what they considered right
against what appeared as a fraudulent legality of the statute.
However, such a broad concept of judicial review was to play a
minor role in actual judicial practice. Since the right to test legislative acts was not generally recognized in Imperial Germany, the
judges, under the Weimar regime, were reluctant to give it too
broad a scope. Consequently their decisions, while sometimes indicating a belief in supra-positive law, usually just tested statutes
for their compatibility with the constitution.
In a decision of December 8, 1923, the Reichsgericht, being
concerned with the validity of an ordinance, stated obiter dictum,
"it is recognized that the courts are in principle authorized to
30Id. at 90.
31 Stahl, who can probably be considered the originator of this specifically German
concept of constitutionalism, defined Rechtsstaat this way: "That the state shall be governed by law [soil Rechtsstaat sein] is the watchword, and is in truth also the trend of
modem development. The state shall exactly define through law (in der Weise des
Rechts), and guarantee against violation, the paths and limits of its own activity as well
as the sphere of freedom of its citizens, and shall therefore enforce moral ideas for reasons
of its, own only to the extent that they fall within the sphere of law, that is only to the
most necessary extent. This is the true concept of the Rechtsstaat and not that the only
function of the state is the administration of the legal order without administrative aims,
or that it should merely protect the rights of the individual, for the term does not refer
to the aim and substance of the state, but only to the ways and means through which
they are to be realized." STAHL, DIE STAATSLEHRE UND DIE PRINZIPIEN DES STAATSRECHTS, lid
ed., 137 (1856). On the concept of tile Rechtsstaat, see also BAEHR, DER REc:HTSsTAAT
(1864); GNEIST, DER RECHTSSTAAT UND DIE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND (1872);
JELLINEK, VERWALTUNGSRECHT, lid ed., §§5, 12, 13, 14 (1931). The latter work contains a
detailed bibliography.
32 Goldschmidt, "Gesetzesdammerung," 53 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 245 (1924).
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examine the formal and material validity of laws."33 In the following months, the courts mainly tested the validity of ordinances,34
but on November 4, 1925, the Reichsgericht came forth with an
unequivocal assertion of the judges' right to pass upon the constitutionality of national statutes.35 The case involved the Revaluation Law of 1925.36 The court, after pointing out that the provisions of the Revaluation Law could be applied only if there were
no valid arguments against their constitutionality, stated that, in
view of the attacks against- the legal ·validity of the law by the public, it was imperative to test the law for its constitutionality. Although, the court continued, under the constitution the judges
are subject to the law they can deny the validity of a national law
to the extent to which it conflicts with superior rules of law. For
instance, "if a statute contradicts ... the provisions of the national
Constitution, ... these provisions remain obligatory for the judge
even against the norms of a subsequent national statute . . . and
they compel the judge not to apply the norms of the statute."37
The court then follows Preuss' argument and states that "since the
... constitution contains no provision denying the right to review
national laws for their constitutionality or vesting that right in
some other branch of government, the right and obligation of the
judge to review legislative acts must be recognized." 38 This decision was a green light for other German courts, and in the last
years of the Weimar Republic judicial review became more and
more accepted by the judiciary.39
33 RGZ. 107, 379. For a discussion of this decision, see MATTERN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 597 ff. (1928). For former decisions dealing with
the problem of judicial review, see RGSt. 56, 177; RGZ. 102, 164; KG. Nov. I, 1921;
Reichsfinanzhof 5, 333, and 7, 97. [German cases are quoted by giving the initials of the
court (RG. for Reichsgericht, KG. for Kammergericht, OVG. for Oberverwaltungsgericht)
or the name of the court first, and the date of the decision next. To the initials of the
Reichsgericht are added Z in civil cases (Zivilsachen), or St. in criminal cases (Strafsachen).
The decisions of the Reichsgericht are quoted by volume and page, as above, or by date.]
84 Reichsgericht decisions of Jan. 25, 1924; March I, 1924. For a discussion of these
decisions, see MATTERN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC
599 ff. (1928). The Staatsgerichtshof dealt with the question of the constitutionality of a
national law in a decision of June 30, 1923. See MATTERN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 604 ff. (1928).
35 RGZ. Ill, 320. For a discussion of this decision see Friedrich, "The Issue of Judicial
Review in Germany," 43 PoL. SCI. Q. 188 at 196 (1928).
861 REICHSGESETZBLATI 117.
37 RGZ. Ill, 320 at 322-323.
SB Id. at 323.
39 See Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht Miinchen, March 20, 1926, 31 DEUTSCHE
JURISTENZEITUNG 903 (1926); REICHSFINANZHOF, Dec. 7, 1926, 32 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG
232 (1927); OVG., Hamburg, Jan. 17, 1927, 56 JURISTISCHE WOCHENsCHRIFr 1288 (1927).
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Concluding we may say that in both France and Germany
there existed, before the Second World War, tendencies toward
the acceptance of judicial review. But whereas in France, due to
· the tradition of legislative supremacy, the advocates of judicial
review could be found mainly among theorists, in Germany,
judicial review became also accepted by the judges. Its adherents
can, in both countries, be classified into two groups. Those who
believe in specific constitutional provisions as the only criterion
for the review of statutes can be distinguished from those who, besides, admit natural or supra-positive law as a guide for the judge.
Among the former were Jalabert and Saleilles in France, Biihler,
Nawiasky in Germany, to mention only a few. 40 Among the advocates of the broader concept of judicial review, France had a
Thaller, Hauriou, Duguit, just as Germany had a Goldschmidt,
von Bieberstein and von Hippel.41 Thus the extension of the'
concept of judicial review seems to follow as naturally from the
acceptance of that concept as does the advocacy of a constitutionoriented judicial review from the fear of legislative supremacy.
The discussion on judicial review before the Second World
War was not confined to France and Germany, but can be noticed
in other European countries. It existed in Greece, Norway and
Rumania, where judicial review was actually practiced, as well as
in states where the judges did not have the right to review legislative acts, such as Belgium and Switzerland.42

III
Numerous as the advocates of judicial review were in Europe
before the Second World War, they formed a minority. What may
be considered the fons et origo of judicial review, namely, Lord
Coke's dictum of 1610 in Dr. Bonham's Case, that "the common
law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them
40 BUEHLER, DIE RE!CHSVERFASSUNG 82 (1920), and "Sind die ordentlichen Gerichte
verpflichtet, verfassungswidrige Gesetze anzuwenden?" 26 DEUTSCHE JURJSTENZEITUNG
580 (1921); Miigel, "Die Rechtsgiiltigkeit des Aufwertungsgesetzes," 31 DEU'ISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 11 (1926); NAWIASKY, BAYERISCHES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 368 ff. (1923), and "Zur
Frage des richterlichen Priifungsrechts," 28 DEU'ISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 40 (1923).
41 MARSCHALL VON BIEBERSTEIN, VoM KAMPF DES RECHTES GEGEN DIE GESETZE (1927);
Goldschmidt, "Gesetzesdiimmerung," 53 JURISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFT 245 (1924); Kaufmann,
"Die Verfassungswidrigkeit des §46 des Gesetzes fiber die Reichsfinanzvenvaltung," 48
JURISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFT 901 (1919), also Kaufmann's remarks at the fourth meeting of
the Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 31 DEU'ISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 653
(1926); Hippel, "Ober die Verbindlichkeit der Gesetze," 18 ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN
REcHTS, Neue Folge 86 (1930).
42 For judicial review in these various countries, see DESFOUGERES, LE CoNTROLE JuDICIAIRE DE LA_ CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES LOIS 66 ff., 105 ff. (1913).
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to be utterly void" as "against Common Right and Reason," 43
achieved only a certain amount of political currency during the
seventeenth century. English judges were reluctant to venture to
declare an act of Parliament void and proceeded according to the
principle laid down by Blackstone, that "the power of parliament
is absolute and without control."44 Legislative supremacy, as much
overlooked by Montesquieu as it was condemned by the American
colonists, was the outstanding feature of English government. It
was to become the main characteristic of most governments on the
continent. As in England, the law, being the product of what
Locke considered the most important branch of government, namely the legislature, was conceived of as the bulwark against a cabinet
justice that had often appeared as gross injustice. Consequently,
there developed a general esteem for the legislature, and a movement for codification of the law swept the continent, led by the
Napoleonic legislation.45 In the ensuing period of juridical positivism judges became mere technicians who were content with
interpreting the letter of the law and accepted everything presented
by the legislature at face value. 46
This development marks indeed a contrast to that of the United
States. Here the idea of Coke played an important role on the eve
of the Revolution. James Qtis invoked Coke's dictum in the
Writs of Assistance Case.41 Other advocates of the colonial cause
voiced similar sentiments. The majority of the constitutional convention at Philadelphia accepted judicial review. 48 For the preservation of free government, judicial review was read into the Constitution by the authors of the Constitution's classic commentary,
the Federalist.49 And after the young Republic had recovered from
its critical period, John Marshall declared a law of Congress void
43 8 CoKE's REP. 107 at 118 (1610).
441 CoOLEY'S BLACKSTONE, 2d ed., 159 (1872).
45 See, in that connection, Savigny's famous warning against codification, VoM BERUF
UNSERER ZEIT FUER GESETZCEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1814), and his "Stimmen fiir
und wider neue Gesetzbiicher," 3 ZEITSCHRJFT FUER GESCHICHTLICHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
No. I (1816).
46 Very characteristic of the positivism of that time is the statement of the French
jurist Bugnet (1794-1886): "I do not know of any civil law; what I teach is only the Code
Napoleon." (Quoted by BoNNECASE, L'EcoLE DE L'EXEGESE EN DROIT CIVIL, 2d ed., 128
(1924). Representatives of the positivist "ecole de l'exegese" were Carre de Malberg, G.
Jeze, M. Waline, G. Ripert, V. J. Basdevant. In Germany, juridical positivism was represented by Laband, Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen; in Italy, by De Ruggiero, Pacchioni,
Orlando, Santi Romano.
47 Quincy's Mass. Rep. 469-485 (1761).
48 See CoRWIN, THE DOCI'RINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1914).
49 See the author's THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (Diss., Princeton, 1952).
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because it conflicted with the Constitution.50 Judicial review thus
became a generally accepted American practice. Although its
exercise was often resented by the public and by such powerful
men as Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt,51
it was soon considered, "together with its juristic product, a body
of 'constitutional law,' ... the most distinctive feature of the American constitutional system."52
We may thus say that the acceptance of judicial review is as
much part of the American tradition as its rejection is characteristic for the constitutional development of European nations.
Hatschek noted at the beginning of the century that the European
judge was to the core convinced of the supremacy of the legislature.53 In the mid-twenties, Thoma was still expressing the prevalent view when he wrote: "Non-exercise of judicial review has
been the traditional practice which was-who could deny it?-from
the point of view of the administration of justice (]ustiz) absolutely
satisfactory. . .. Non-exercise of judicial review ... is German,
even European tradition and certainly causa favorabilis." 54 Why
this great difference between America and Europe? Historical,
juristic and political reasons account for it.
To the American colonists, acts of Parliament often appeared
oppressive. As a result, resistance developed against the English
legislature. After the colonies had become independent their new
constitutions provided, as a reaction against the strong executive
under the royal charters, for a concentration of power in the legis501 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
51 See Jefferson's letter to W. H. Torrance of June 11, 1815, 14 THE WRlTINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Mem. ed. 1903), 302-306; Jackson's veto, in 1832, of the Bank of the
United States, J. D. RICHARDSON, comp.• 2 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 582 (1907); Lincoln's opinion on the Dred Scott decision, 2 WORKS (Federal ed. 1905), 291 ff.; Roosevelt's "Fireside Chat on the Reorganization of the Judiciary"
of March 9, 1937, 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 122 ff.
(1941).
52 Corwin, "Judicial Review," 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 457 (1932).
53 1 ENGLISCHES STAATSRECHT 140 (1950).
54 Thoma, "Das richterliche Priifungsrecht," 43 ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS
267 at 274 (1922). For similar statements, see Larnaude, "Etudes sur les garanties judiciaires qui existent dans certains pays au profit des particuliers contre les actes du
pouvoir legislatif," 31 BULI.ETIN DE LA SOCIEI'E DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 175 at 227
(1902): "Such legislature with a limited capacity is incompatible with our traditional conception of this supreme organ of sovereignty." Jean Signore! said: "With
our temperament and our ideas on popular sovereignty, we would never tolerate a single
assembly, composed of eight or ten judges having the power to hold in check the will of
the Legislature, or, in other words, that. of the nation." 40 REVUE PoLmQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 534 (1904). Duguit declared: "French jurisprudence has never admitted, nor
will it admit today, that French courts may refuse to apply a law because of its unconstitutionality." 3 TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 670 (1923).
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lature. Again, many of the state laws, reflecting the will of a sheer
majority, infringed upon the vested rights of the individual; again,
the lawmaker appeared as oppressor. Advocacy of judicial review,
as a check upon the legislature, seemed as natural with Hamilton as
it had been with James Otis. The situation was quite different in
Europe. Here, the absolute ruler was considered the oppressor.
The courts, having been for the most part subservient to the king,
had no chance of being considered the liberators of the people.
That role fell to those who established representative government
and their favorite instrument, the legislature.
In France, for instance, the king under the ancien regime was
the realm's chief administrator. Through his power to promulgate
edicts and ordinances, he exercised the superior legislative function. Finally, he rendered justice in all cases he pleased to invoke
in his council. After the monarchy had been overthrown by the
Revolution the people, used to governmental omnipotence, transferred the sovereignty that had rested in the prince to their representatives. Although the separation of powers had been proclaimed
as a criterion for constitutionalism,55 no steps were actually taken
to restrict the power of the government or to insure the protection
of the individual's rights. In theory, sovereignty had passed from
the king to the people; in practice, it was in the Assembly.
The revolutionaries felt no inclination to permit the courts to
control legislative acts. They had not forgotten how the old courts
had abused their right of "verification et remontrances," how the
judiciary had, in the last years of the ancien regime, been opposed
to the reforms that were intended by the king. Besides, the judges
had the reputation of being opposed to the revolutionary ideas.
Consequently, judicial review was prohibited in many of the laws
that were adopted in the years after the Revolution, 56 and the
Court of Cassation made sure that these provisions were abided by.
This did not change after the fall of the Empire, in the days of
the Monarchy of July, the Second Republic. 57 In the Second Empire, the Senate was the guardian of the constitution.58 The third
55 Compare art. 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of Aug. 26,
1789: "Any society, in which the enforcement of rights is not guaranteed and the separation of powers not definitely stated, does not possess a Constitution."
56 Law of August 16-24, 1790, arts. IO and 11; Constitution of September 3, 1791, title
Ill, chapter 5, art. 3; Constitution of 5 fructidor, year III, art. 203; Penal Code (Code
penal), art. 127.
57 See DESFOUGERFS, CONTROLE JUDICIAIRE DE LA CoNSTITUTIONNALITE DES LOIS 94 ff.
(1903); Ho HIO KY, LE CONTROLE DE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES LOIS EN FRANCE 135 (Diss.,
Paris, 1926).
li8 Art. 9 of the Law upon the Organization of the Senate of February 24, 1875.
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Republic thus inherited a constitutional tradition that denied the
exercise of judicial review.
The situation was similar in Germany. In the ]ustizstaat under
the First Reich, the police power of the prince (ius politiae) was
restricted by the vested rights (iura quaesita) of the subjects. In
spite of a rather intricate procedure, the Reich courts often succeeded in protecting the individual from the government. However, not all princes would subject themselves to the verdicts of the
Reich courts, which resulted in a decrease of the judges' prestige.
Under the subsequent Polizeistaat of the eighteenth century, the
courts had lost their independence and were considered as a means
of cabinet justice.59 The fight against absolutism was primarily
fought for the supremacy of the law that was made not by the
prince alone, but also by the representatives of the people. The
ensuing independence of the judiciary was an independence which
existed under the law made by the legislature, not one above that
law. The ordinary courts at first and later the administrative
courts could test the legality of administrative acts (Gesetzmassigkeit der V erwaltung). They were not supposed to test legislation
itself for its constitutionality. Rechtsstaat meant the protection of
the citizen from the executive through the legislature and judiciary, but it did not imply a protection from the lawmaker through
the judges.60
In Italy, diverse forms of cabinet-justice existed in the component states until the Napoleonic invasion brought the ideas ·of
the French Revolution to that country between 1796 and 1815.
The French legal codes were considered by the Italian masses as
documents which brought about liberation from the arbitrary
government of the princes, the aristocratic cliques and the judges
who were in their service. The defeat of Napoleon resulted in a
temporary comeback of the ousted rulers, but could not quell the
Italians' yearning for a rule of law and their participation in the
law-making process. As a concession to the liberal spirit which
swept over Piedmont as well as over the rest of Europe, the king
of Piedmont in 1848 granted a written constitution. It was
modeled along the lines of the Belgian constitution of 1831, vesting legislative power in the representatives of the people, and
subjecting the executive and the judiciary to the law. With the
unification of the country, the Statuto of Piedmont became the
69 See JELLINEK, VERWALTUNGSRECHT,

60

3d ed., §5 (1931).
See the literature cited in note 31 supra.
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Italian constitution. In the following years, the Italians adopted
the German concept of the Rechtsstaat. The public authority
was, for the sake of the individual, restricted by a system of norms
that were made by the law-maker. These norms were not only
binding upon the administration, but also upon the courts. The
judges had no right to question their validity.61
The juristic arguments against judicial review correspond to
the traditional acceptance of legislative power. In general, they
-consisted in the refutation of the official American doctrine, as
laid down in Federalist, No. 78, and in Marbury v. Madison. 62
This doctrine was based on the following reasons: first, the quality
-0f the constitution as superior, and that of the statute as inferior
law; second, that judicial review followed logically from the prindple of the separation of powers; and third, that the judges, by
their very learning and calling, were the natural interpreters of
the law and had therefore to decide whether there existed a conflict between constitution and statute.
In the United States, the exceptional rejection of the principle
lex posterior derogat priori was justified through the principle
lex superior derogat inferiori. In Europe, no distinction between
a superior constitutional and an inferior ordinary law was generally recognized. For Esmein, "the constitution does not create
the state which is already existing as a natural result of the formation of the nation, but simply determines the form of the state
and the government. It is a law like other laws." Calling the
greater stability of constitutional provisions artificial, Esmein
goes on to say that, as compared with ordinary laws, constitutional
laws are "simply (solely) more important and more difficult to
establish and to change," and denies their superior quality. 63 He
then goes on to advocate that the amending power be vested in the
61 The outstanding pioneer for the Rechtsstaat in Italy was V. E. Orlando. See his
PRIMO TRATrATO COMPL'ET0 DI DIRrIT0 AMMINISTRATIV0 (1900), and his later work, I Crun:ru
TECNICI PER LA R!COSTRUZIONE GIURIDICA DEL DIRrITo PUBBLICO (1925). s. Romano,
L'ORDINAMllNTO Grurumco (1902) was also important for the institution of the Rechtsstaat
in Italy. A decade later, O. Raneletti gave to the Rechtsstaat a clear juristic form. He
-established the thesis: "In the modem state the law stands above all other activities;
everything, including the state itself, must remain subject to the law, and must live and
operate according to its norms. The state, inasmuch as it subjects itself to the law and
guarantees its enforcement even with respect to itself, by means of appropriate measures,
is a State governed by law [Stato di diritto]." PRINCIPII DI DIRITrO AMMINISTRATIV0 142
(1912). For a discussion of the development of the concept of Rechtsstaat in Italy, see
Caristia, "Ventura e avventure di una formula: Rechtsstaat," R!VISTA DI DIRITrO Punnuco
!188 (19!14).
62 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 1!17 (180!1). For a conventional statement of the doctrine, see
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 at 544 (192!1).
63 1 ELEMENTS DE DR0IT CoNSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 412-41!1 (1921).
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representative branch of government, i.e., the legislature. Thus
an outstanding authority on French constitutional law supports the
view that in the constituent act the constituent power (pouvoir
constituant) is being transferred to a constituted power ( pouvoir
constitue), namely, the legislature. The competence of the ordinary lawmaker to amend the constitution meant the elimination
of the distinction between superior constitutional and inferior
ordinary law and deprived the doctrine of judicial review of its
main foundation.
Esmein's theory, so complementary to the French concept of
government by assembly, not only became the accepted doctrine
in France; in Italy also, under the Albertian Statute, it was accepted
in theory as well as in practice. 64 In Germany, the opponents of
judicial review originally followed mainly the doctrine of Laband:
the promulgation of the law by the Kaiser did not only create a
praesumptio iuris, but a praesumptio iuris et de iure for the legality and authenticity of the law, and, thus, precluded judicial
review. 65 Although this doctrine was in principle taken over by
the commentators on the Weimar constitution, their leading
figure, Anschutz, based his rejection of judicial review mainly upon
the fact that under Article 76 of that constitution "the constitution may be amended by way of legislation." From this he concluded that "the constitution and the statute are manifestations of
the will of the very same power, the legislative power." 66 Consequently, a constitutional provision could not be superior to that
of an ordinary law.
In America, judicial review is considered a corollary to the
64 See 2 PALMA, DIRITro Cosrrruz10NALE, 3d ed., 620-621 (1884): "In Italy, whatever
may be thought theoretically of the American system, it is certain that judges do not pos•
sess the same powers as those vested in that [American] Supreme Court. We have already
noted that the power to change statutory provisions as the need arises, and therefore [the
power to change] even the so-called constitutional provisions, is always alive and vested in
the legislative organs of the state; certainly the power to interpret the constitution must
belong to them. A power, such as the mentioned power of American judges, if
vested in our judges, would immobilize our Constitution and would hinder its legal development according to the evolution of the national conscience; it would prevent legitimate activities of the legislative branch of the Government and it would tum a few judges,
appointed by the king and a minister and whose duty it is to adjudicate according to law
and not to pass judgment on the law, into censors of the Parliament; it would confer
upon them, rather than on the legislative branch, the status of superior organ of the
state, and of the state's needs, interests and rights. Such a pretension would be completely unconstitutional in Italy."
65 2 LABAND, DAS STAATSRECHT DES DEUTSCHEN R.EICHES 43 ff. (1878). See also MEYER•
ANSCHUETZ, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed., 740 (1919).
66Dra VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN R.EICHS, 14th ed., art. 76, no. I. See also art. 102,
nos. 3-4 (1932).
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principle of the separation of powers. In Europe, judicial review
was generally thought to involve confusion of powers and to be
incompatible with that principle. In many instances, the arguments of European jurists follow those of Justice Gibson in his
famous answer to Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison. 61
According to Signore!, the main objection by the French to judicial
review is their version of the separation of powers. Judicial review was "contrary . . . to the spirit of our legislation," he says,
and incompatible with the idea of the government of law which
implied a government of the lawmaker. 68 As Esmein put it, the
judges' function "is to apply, but not to test the laws, which is to
say that they are competent to apply and interpret ordinary laws,
but that they have no competency whatsoever to apply and interpret the constitution," something that is preserved to the
pouvoir constituant, namely, the legislature. 69 Judicial review,
stated a decision of the Belgian Court of Cassation, "would amount
to an abolition of legislative power and the principle of the separation of powers . . . [under which] the legislative power has to
make the laws, the judicial power has to apply them, and the executive power has to execute them." 70 The Swiss Bluntschli stated
that if the judges had the right to test legislative acts, then every
official whose duty it was to apply the law had such a right. 71
Finally the German Laband developed Bluntschli's argument and
invoked the reductio ad absurdum by implying that not only those
who applied the law, but also all those who were living under the
law would, in case of an admission of judicial review, have a right
to test the validity of legislation. This did not just amount to a
confusion of powers, but to a confusion of the laws, an anarchy. 72
American advocates of judicial review, following what they believed to be the reasoning of Hamilton in the Federalist, consistently insisted that judicial review does not involve a supremacy of the
judiciary. Naturally, Europeans did not agree with them. As a
matter of fact, a more careful study of Federalist, No. 78 reveals
that a superiority of the courts over the legislature was actually
67 Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sug. &: R. (Pa.) 330 (1825).
68 "Le controle du pouvoir legislatif," 40 REvuE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 77,
519, 525 (1904). Cf. Larnaude, "L'inconstitutionnalite des lois et le droit public fran!,3.is,''
126 REvuE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 181 (1926).
69 ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 592 (1921).
70 Quoted and discussed in DESFOUGERES, CONTROLE JUDICIAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES LoIS 104 (1903).
71 BLUNTSCHLI, .Al.LGEMEINES STAATSRECHT 133, n. 2 (1876).
72 2 I.ABAND, DAS STAATSRECHT DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES 44-45 (1878).
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admitted by Hamilton.73 On this score, European jurists tend to
agree wholeheartedly. Esmein's "grave objection" against the
American system, that it amounted to "an elevation of the judicial
over the legislative power," 74 expressed the view of the majority
of European jurists in the decades preceding World War II. Not
many doubts were raised as to the qualification of the judges to
interpret the laws. However, there can be noticed, in connection
with statements maintaining that judicial review establishes
judicial supremacy, an apprehension lest the judges deviate from
their duty of impartiality and become motivated by political considerations. "Judges are men," said Signore!, and "the power to
pass on the validity of laws . . . is . . . a very dangerous weapon
... for an active participation in the field of politics where they
could lose a great deal of their authority, prestige, and independence." Maintaining that in a democracy it is necessary that the
courts be strong and respected, and the judges honored for their
professional attainments, their moderation of desires and ambitions, independence of character, their firmness behind their
opinions; and their pride of spirit, Signore! warned that "these
qualities were in danger of being sacrificed if the judge were
charged with the duty to examine the laws for their validity, because it would . . . almost always involve him in political
questions. " 75
This takes us, finally, to the political considerations against
judicial review. Esmein's statement of the preceding paragraph
is followed by the apprehensive thought that the acceptance of
judicial review would amount to the transformation of the judiciary into a political department which was "superior to all others,.
superior even to the will of the nation as manifested in the forms
of representative government." 76 According to Kelsen, such a
court would be nothing but a legislative body. 77 This was of little
attraction for most Europeans. Larnaude rejected it on the ground
that it was a "hybrid body, half-judicial, half-legislative," under
73 He called the judiciary "an intermediate body between the people and the legislature" which had the function "to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority." If the people, as he also maintains, are superior to the legislature, and thecourts stand between the people and the legislature, the courts must be as superior to thelegislature as they are inferior to the people. ,
74 ELEMENTS DE DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 589 (1921).
75 "Le controle du pouvoir legislatif," 40 REvuE POLITIQUE Er PARLEMENTAIRE 535536 (1904).
76 ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 589 (1921).
77 In ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PUBLIC 94 (1929) and "Lagarantie juridictionnelle de Ia constitution," 45 REvuE DU DROIT PUBLIC 197 ff. (1928)-
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which "justice would be lost and nothing gained by politics or
legislation."78 Charmont added that a decision of a judge acting
as a law maker "will always appear individual, arbitrary, and partial."79 All these statements indicate doubts with regard to the
ability of the judges to understand current issues and problems.
This fear was to a large degree based upon the attitude of the
American Supreme Court which appeared to many Europeans as
ultra-conservative and reactionary. Edouard Lambert, commenting on the methods that were used by the Supreme Court to secure
Justice Sutherland's ideal of a "tempered democracy," regretted
that the Court engrafted upon the original Constitution an economic-judicial constitution.80 Hugo Preuss stated that his plan to
provide for judicial review in the Weimar constitution was
opposed by the Social Democrats mainly because they were horrified by the "notorious practice of the United States Supreme
Court."81 The fear of a reactionary judiciary was also based upon
the fact that the judges were traditionally recruited from the more
conservative strata of society. A reactionary judiciary, empowered
to check the acts of a progressive legislature, it was feared, would
provoke revolutionary movements with resultant instability.82
Finally, judicial review was opposed on the ground that it
created legal disunity and insecurity. If all the courts would have
the right to review legislative acts, it was argued, the unity of the
law was in danger of being lost. More important still, judicial
review, advocated as a means for securing a government of law, was
said to be actually incompatible with that principle. Not only
did it create a government of a selected few-the judges-but, by
making the validity of a law dependent upon the sanction of the
courts, it created a distrust in all acts of the non-judicial branches
of government. The result was not a state of the government of
law, but a state of anarchy.83
78 "L'inconstitutionnalite des lois et le droit public £ran~," 126 REvuE POLITIQUE
PARLEMENTAIRE 181 at 222 (1926).
70 CHARMONT, LA RENAISSANCE DU DROIT NATUREL 189 (1910).
so Lambert, "Quatre annees d'exercice du controle de la constitutionnalite des lois
par la Cour supreme des Etats•Unis," MELANGES HAURIOU 467ff. (1929).
81Letter to Morstein-Marx of Feb. 26, 1954. Quoted in MoRSTEIN-MARX, VARIATIONEN
-OBER RICHTERLICHE ZUSTAENDIGKEIT ZUR PRUEliUNG DER REcliTMAESSlGKEIT DES GESETZES 32-33
(1927).
82 See Louis LeFur's review of E. Lambert, "Le gouvemement des juges et la Jutte
contre la legislation sociale aux Etats-Unis" (1921), 39 REvuE DU DROIT PUBLIC 306 at
313-314 (1922).
83 See the opinions of Bluntschli and Laband, supra notes 71 and 72. Similar MEYER•
ANSCHUETZ, I.EHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed., 740 (1919); KELSEN, ANNUAIRE
DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PUBLIC 199 (1929).
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Concluding it can be said that judicial review, although advocated by many, was generally rejected in Europe prior to World
War II. Historical, juristic and political reasons that were often
connected accounted for the refusal of a doctrine which, although
it had its roots in the Old World, became one of the central features
of constitutionalism in the New World. In view of this tradition,
the establishment of judicial review by the modern constitutions
of Western Europe can be considered a revolutionary feat. Not
only was judicial review accepted, but it also was given a scope that
surpassed the hopes of its keenest advocates in the past decades.

IV
The introduction of judicial review in Europe after the Second
World War was not accompanied by fundamentally new ideas on
that institution. As a matter of fact, it appears doubtful if, in
view of the extensive literature that had already come into existence, such ideas could be expected. Since the main arguments
concerning judicial review were surveyed in the preceding pages,
we shall now confine ourselves to a consideration of the actual
organization and scope of judicial review in the postwar period.
Judicial review appears to be weakest in France. Indeed, the
question is justified whether it can be said to exist at all. Under
Article 91 of the constitution, a Constitutional Committee
(Comite Constitutionnel) shall "determine whether the laws passed
by the National Assembly imply an amendment of the constitution." The Constitutional Committee is composed of the President of the Republic as the presiding officer, the presidents of the
National Assembly and the Council of the Republic, seven members elected by the National Assembly and three members elected
by the Council of the Republic at the beginning of each annual
session of these legislative bodies. The committee thus reflects
the composition of the political and, especially, the legislative
branches of government, and can hardly be expected to declare
a national law void.
Since the committee is authorized only to "determine whether
the laws . . . imply an amendment of the constitution," its function is restricted to reminding the legislature that a certain bill,
in order to become law, will have to be passed with the majority
required for constitutional amendment. The committee cannot
strike down laws for being unconstitutional. This supervisory
power is further decreased through the provision that no bill shall
be examined for its compatibility with the preamble. Since the

1957]

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPE

559

individual's basic rights are guaranteed by the preamble, judicial
review, as exercised by the Constitutional Committee, cannot be
expected to be an institution for the protection of the individual.
Also, the Constitutional Committee is liable to abolition by an
ordinary statute without any possibility that the questioh of the
constitutionality of such a statute could be raised.
Finally, the committee examines laws only upon the joint
request from the President of the Republic and the President of
the Council of the Republic, the council having decided the matter
by a majority of its members. In other words, questions of constitutionality do not come to the committee upon appeal from inferior ordinary or administrative courts. Therefore, since the
committee is beyond the pale of the judicial hierarchy, doubts have
been voiced as to whether it is a judicial body at all.
Maspetiol is probably right when he states that the committee
is a political rather than a judicial institution, because its "conciliatory functions have primacy over its strictly judicial functions." 84
The role the committee has played so far seems to support this
statement. Nevertheless, it would go too far to deny that there
exists some form of judicial review under the Fourth Republic. A
beginning was made here that stands in contrast to the practice
under the Third Republic. And although the probability that
the Constitutional Committee will just reflect the views of the
political departments is great, it cannot be taken for granted.
Since the members of the committee who are elected by the two
legislative chambers have to be jurists who are not members of
the legislature, and since the President of the Republic is independent of the legislature, there exists the possibility that the committee might disagree with the legislative body. Besides, the
donning of the robe is likely to temper the political prejudices
of the members. Thus in spite of its restricted jurisdiction, the
Constitutional Committee will in many cases be able to delay
legislation that it considers incompatible with the constitution
and make the amending power aware of the importance of the
question at issue.85
•
Under the Italian Constitution, judicial review exists in a
84 Maspetiol, "Le problbne de la loi et ses developpements recents dans le droit
public franr,;ais,'' ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS, CONSEIL D'ETAT 62 (1949).
85 For judicial review in France after 1945, see l.EMASURIER, LA CoNsrmmoN DE
1946 ET LE CoNTROLE JURIDICTIONNEL DU l.EGISLATEUR (1954), which contains a valuable
bibliography; DUVERGER, MANUEL DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 5th
ed., 376-378 (1948); VEDEL, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CoNsrmJTIONNEL 551-556
(1949); PRELOT, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 539-541 (1950); 3 BURDEAUX, ThAITE DE
SCIENCE POLITIQUE 346ff. (1950).
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stronger form than in France. The Constitutional Court (Corte
Costituzionale) is composed of fifteen eminent jurists, one-third
appointed by the President of the Republic, one-third by the legislature, and one-third by the supreme ordinary and administrative judicial bodies, for a term of twelve years. Since the judges'
terms are staggered, the court is a continuing body which enjoys
a certain independence of the political departments and is, with
respect to its composition, not a mere reflection of these departments. Consequently, it could become an effective check upon
the legislature.
In contrast to its French counterpart, the Constitutional Court
has the authority to judge "controversies concerning the constitutional legality of the laws and the acts having the force of law, of
the Italian State and the Regions" (Art. 134). Although some
authors consider the court's right to review national laws as only
incidental to its function to test regional laws in order to secure
the unity of law in a regionalized nation, it admits of no doubt
that the court can examine national laws for their constitutionality.
Like in France, however, the exercise of judicial review is not
likely to protect the individual from transgressions upon his rights
by the political departments, since the constitution, while containing a bill of rights, leaves their restriction to the discretion of the
legislature.
The Constitutional Court examines laws upon the request of
inferior courts. The question of the constitutionality of a national
law can be raised by a litigant party or by the judge of the lower
court itself. This procedure makes the Constitutional Court a
truly judicial body of final appeal and assures the Italians of a
more genuine judicial review than exists in France. As to the
actual work of the court, no comment can yet be made, since the
court was established only in December 1955, due to the fact that
until then the political parties in parliament could not agree
as to the five members who were to be appointed by them.86
The system set up under the Bonn Basic Law is in many
respects similar to that under the Italian constitution. The twentyfour members of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) are elected in equal numbers by the two legisla86For judicial review in postwar Italy, see 11 Arn DELL'AssEMBLEA CoSTITUENTE
(Seduta de 31 gennaio 1948), 4336; LUCIFREDI, LA NUOVA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA 197-205
(1952); ESPOSITO, LA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA 263-281 (1954).
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tive chambers. Eight of the judges are selected from the high
federal courts, and get the same tenure to which they were entitled
there, i.e., as a rule, for life. The other sixteen members hold
office for eight years. The. rule that only eight of the sixteen
temporary members shall be elected at one time guarantees that
the Federal Constitutional Court will, as a rule, be differently
composed than the legislature. Thus the mode of electioncombining permanency with change-seems, together with the high
qualifications for the judges, to provide for a court that can be
an effective check upon the legislature.
Like the Italian court, the Federal Constitutional Court has
the right to test national laws for their constitutionality (Art. 93
Basic Law). Since under the Basic Law civil rights are not subject
to infringements by the political branches of the government, the
court can be considered a stronghold for the individual's protection.
This greater protection of the individual is also apparent in
the procedure by which a constitutional problem is brought before
the court. Whenever a lower court in a pending case doubts the
constitutionality of a law pertinent to the adjudication of the case,
the court must stay proceedings and refer the question of constitutionality to the Federal Constitutional Court. Likewise a litigant
who challenges the constitutionality of a law can, if the courts hold
against him, after exhaustion of appeals, carry the case to the
Federal Constitutional Court. This "constitutional complaint"
(Verfassungsbeschwerde) can be launched by anyone who feels
his rights infringed upon by the public authorities. The Federal
Constitutional Court is thus a truly judicial body. As such it has,
ever since its establishment in 1949, demonstrated its power vis-avis the political departments and increased its prestige.87
We may thus say that among the major continental nations,
Germany has gone farthest in accepting and practicing judicial
review. This is not surprising in view of the fact that judicial
review had, in the days of the Weimar Republic, not only been
advocated by theorists, but also exercised by the courts. In a reaction to its denial under the Hitler regime, and the dictator's
87 On judicial review in the Bonn Republic, see VON MANG0LDT, DAS BoNNER GRUNDGESETZ, arts. 92-94 (1953), and the authorities cited there. GIESE, GRUNDGESETZ FUER nm
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 3d ed. (1953), gives a survey of the decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court (pp. 225-236).
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distortion of the law, there was, after the war, a strong feeling in
favor of the official recognition of judicial review. As a consequence, it was provided for in the different state constitutions,88
and, in the postwar years, amply applied. Thus its acceptance by
the framers of the Basic Law and its exercise by the Federal Constitutional Court only brought to a conclusion a previous development on the state level, for which the practice under the Weimar
Republic had prepared the way.
However, the courts expanded the scope of judicial review
considerably. In the twenties, German judges had only dared to
exercise the conventional form of judicial review, i.e., to test
statutes for their compatibility with the written constitution. Now
the courts went so far as to examine the validity of laws upon their
compatibility with supra-legal norms and natural law and thus
realized the dreams of the most daring advocates of judicial review
during the previous decades.
The expansion of the scope of judicial review did not remain
restricted to the testing of statutes upon natural law. Once natural
law concepts had been transmuted into some of the provisions of
the new constitutions, the question arose whether the courts had
the right to test other constitutional norms for their compatibility
with those provisions. This implied the possibility of unconstitutional constitutional norms. This possibility was admitted by different state courts89 and, later, by the Federal Constitutional
Court.90 And although no constitutional provision was actually
invalidated on the grounds of a conflict with superior constitutional norms, the courts maintained that, in a given case, the judges
would have the right to do so. A far-reaching expansion of judicial
review indeed!
88 See note 2 supra.
89 Decisions of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof von Wiirttemberg-Baden of November l!I,
1950, 32 DEUTSCHE RECHTS-ZEITSCHRIFT 566 (1950); of the Staatgerichtshof of Hesse of
July 20, 1951; the Oberverwaltungsgericht Liineburg of March 3, 1950, 65 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATI 407 (1950); the Bavarian Verfassungsgerichtshof of June IO, 1949, 2 VER.WALTUNGS-RECHTSPRECHUNG No. 2 (1950); the Bavarian Verfassungsgerichtshof of April 4,
1950, 2 VERWALTUNGS-RECHTSPRECHUNG No. 65 (1950); of March 14, 1951, 4 DIE OEFFENTLICHE VER.WALTUNG 471 (1951).
90 Decision of December 18, 1953, 9 JURISTENZEITUNG 35 (1954). For a discussion of this
decision, the decisions mentioned in the preceding note, and the problem of unconstitutional constitutional norms, see the author's "Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms?"
42 VA. L. REv. 1 (1956).
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V
The preceding pages have shown that the European nations
have taken definite steps toward the institution of judicial review.
However, it is also evident that the degree to which judicial review
was established varies in France, Italy and Germany. This again
seems to prove the old truism that law and legal practice are conservative and cannot escape their tradition. But it is also indicative of a varying enthusiasm toward judicial review. By no means
has the criticism of that institution, so prevalent during the past
decades, ceased to exist. It"was evident in the conventions which
framed the new constitutions, and could be noticed ever since.91
This leaves us, then, to ask why the major continental powers have,
since World War II, swung toward judicial review.
Mere juristic-logical reasoning cannot supply an answer. · Ever
since the fundamental juristic positions were taken in Marbury v.
Madison and Eakin v. Raub, juristic arguments in favor of judicial
review were convincingly answered by jurists who opposed judicial
review. The futility of merely juristic argumentation was recognized by Thoma as early as 1922, when he based his refutation of
judicial review exclusively upon considerations of policy, by
evaluating the different interests ( allseitige Interessenabwiigung). 92
The fact that Morstein-Marx, by using the same subjective method,
arrived at an affirmation of judicial review,93 does not refute the
fundamental soundness of Thoma's thesis. What, then, we have
to ask, were the interests that brought about the recognition of
judicial review? They were fundamentally those which before
the Second World War made the majority of Europeans decide
against it, and which may be identified by the term constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism may be defined as a condition under which
the individual is protected from arbitrary government. As was
shown, the Europeans' fight for constitutionalism was fought
against cabinet justice for an increase of legislative power. Constitutionalism meant the restriction of governmental power
91 See notes 85-87 supra.
G2 "Das richterliche Priifungsrecht," 43 A.RCHIV DES OEFFENlLICHEN RECHTS 267 (1922).
Also in France, the discussion of judicial review turned, between the two wars, mainly on
the question of whether its institution was advisable as a matter of good policy. See 3
BURDEAU, TRAITE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 346-347 (1950) and the authorities cited there.
OS V.AIUATIONEN, etc.
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through the law. Law being restrictive of government for the
sake of the individual, there was no reason or interest for testing
it or curtailing the power of those who made it. However, by the
end of the Second World War the law had lost to most Europeans
its quality as a Magna Charta for the individual. Under juridical
positivism, it had increasingly become an expression of state
authority, until under the dictatorships it degenerated into a means
for the suppression of the individual. As a result of this reversal
people, rather than believing in a protection through the law, felt
the need of a protection from the law, and came to accept judicial
review.
The establishment of judicial review can only in a restricted
sense be considered a refutation of the continental tradition. Without any doubt, the practice of not examining legislative acts,
hallowed through generations, had become a European tradition.
But, since its purpose was only to guarantee constitutionalism,
it was only complementary to and part of that more comprehensive
tradition. When the law became the individual's oppressor rather
than his liberator, and legislative supremacy therefore became
destructive of constitutionalism, judicial review was introduced to
preserve the tradition of constitutionalism. The means was
changed in order to secure the end.
The acceptance of judicial review as a means for the preservation of constitutionalism-defined as a condition under which the
individual is protected from arbitrary government-has certain
consequences for the scope of that institution. Clearly, the more
judicial review is likely to protect the rights of the individual,
the more it fulfills its purpose. Therefore, the exclusion of laws
concerning civil rights from the testing function of the courts
must result in a rather ineffective form of judicial review. The
German constitution-makers were more aware of this than their
French and Italian counterparts and provided for the judges'
authority to test laws regulating basic rights. They went even
farther. Realizing the danger inherent in the European practice
of amending the constitution through a qualified majority of the
legislative body, the constitutional provisions securing basic rights
were exempted from the amending process and thus protected
even from the amending power.04 This creation of superior and
94 Art. 79 Basic Law; constitutions of Bavaria (1946) arL 98; Hesse (1946), art. 26;
Rhineland-Palatinate (1947), arL 129 in connection with the preamble, arts. 1 and 74;
Bremen (1947), art. 20; also, in a more indirect way, Baden (1947), art. 92 in connection
with the preamble.

1957]

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPE

565

inferior constitutional norms expanded the scope of judicial review
by subjecting to it constitutional norms and amendments. In a
word, the individual was protected not only from the legislature
in its capacity as ordinary lawmaker ( pouvoir constitue), but also
in its capacity as constitution-maker (pouvoir constituant).
It appears doubtful whether any form of judicial review which
is less comprehensive than the German can, in view of the increasing power of the democratic majority, be considered an adequate
means for the preservation of constitutionalism and the protection
of the minority and the individual. As was pointed out elsewhere, 95 the different scope of judicial review in the postwar constitutions is largely due to the fact that the French and Italians
were content with a revival of natural law concepts of the age of
reason, whereas the Germans were also influenced by the older,
aristotelian-scholastic concept of natural law. Aware of the shortcomings of the Weimar constitution that facilitated Hitler's rise
to power, the Germans were more cautious in the acceptance of
all that was made by a democratic constitution-maker who, after all,
was human and, therefore, not infallible. As to the absence of the
older natural law, dangerous similarities can, indeed, be noticed
between the French and Italian constitutions and their counterparts in East Germany and the other people's democracies. Nevertheless, the steps taken by France and Italy toward judicial review
stand in sharp contrast to those that were taken in Eastern Europe
toward legislative supremacy and the exclusion of any form of
judicial review. After a beginning has been made, judicial review
may, in time, also in France and Italy become a true bulwark for
the protection of the individual, and fulfill its purpose as a means
for the continuation of constitutionalism.
In the decades before the Second World War, the European
nations were concerned with the question whether judicial review should be established at all. Judicial review then had advocates among theorists in France and Italy, whereas in Germany it
was also exercised by the courts. Since 1945, each nation has
advanced a step. France and Italy advanced from a theoretical
advocacy toward the actual establishment of judicial review.
Germany advanced from the exercise of conventional judicial
review toward a judicial review that was oriented toward higher
law and comprised the right to declare constitutional norms void.
95 See the author's "Natural Law in the Modern European Constitutions," l NATURAL
73 (1956).
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Before the war, the advocates of judicial review, ranging from those
who believed in natural law and unwritten law as a criterion for
judicial review to those who were only willing to admit positive
constitutional law for such a criterion, marshalled their small forces
against those who rejected judicial review. Today, the former
minority has become the majority. The question is no longer
whether there should be judicial review, but rather, to which
degree it should exist. From its traditional rejection of judicial
review, Europe has, for the sake of constitutionalism, come a long

way.

